Responsibility and Reputation System for self-driven diligent fund allocation
Published
4/28/2023, 7:05:59 PM
Closes
5/4/2023, 10:00:00 PM
Votes
15
Voting Type
single choice
Quorum
0
Author
990x99C9...8183Proposal Content
Summary
Well hello to you fellow investors! Reading the last proposal, made me realise again how reckless some of our early investments were. Also if you think about that a recent propo...
Well hello to you fellow investors!
- Reading the last proposal, made me realise again how reckless some of our early investments were.
- Also if you think about that a recent proposal was for a project that was rug pulled a few days ago (Ordinals Finance OFI with up to $4000 fund allocation).
- Therefore, I want to adress some flaws that hinder a good self-driven governance. I will name each problem, then make a suggestion for a self-imposed regulatory measures.
1. The proposer can decide on the amounts of fund allocation without limitations. It is only capped by our current free liquidity
2. Proposers have only benefits. They have no risks and cannot be held accountable for losses of funds.
3. The community cannot really judge or measure the experience and effort or how much thought a proposer puts in their investment choices.
Adressing Problem 1:
I suggest that a proposer has to have 10% of the maximum "fund allocation" value in DCIP tokens. For example, I create a proposal for more ETH with the options "$1000, $2000 and $5000, disagree" then I would need $500 of DCIP tokens in my wallet (10% of the highest option).
Adressing Problem 2:
If the community votes in favour to the proposal, the proposer has to give DCIP tokens equal to 10% of the amount as collateral, which is locked until the position is liquidated (like locked staking). But should the position fall below double the initial value of the collateral, the position and the collateral will both be liquidated automatically recouping some liquidity for the fund.
For example: $5000 investment with $500 collateral reaches $1000 (-80% loss) = 2 x $500, then the remaining $1000 assets and $500 collateral will be liquidated to flow back into our free liquidity, leading to a -70% loss instead of -80%.
Still, the proposer gets a percentage of the profits for his collateral at risk. I'd say 6,5 % would be fair (0,7 x 500/(5000 + 500)).
Adressing Problem 3:
There's currently no way to build a reputation from previous proposals. Maybe its a good idea to add a function that gives insight into the proposal history of the adress.
For the votes:
- Disagree
- Agree - with 1, 2 and 3 (pick the number for highlighting the corresponding problem)
Voting Results
6132.34B
214.93B
626.52B
466.90B
Total Votes
15
Total Score
7440.69B